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PROTECTING EMPLOYEE
SOLICITATION-DISTRIBUTION
RIGHTS FROM UNION WAIVER
Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act guarantees various
fundamental rights to employees, including the right to self-organization.'
Recognizing the inherent superiority of the work place as a situs for
organizational activities, 2 the courts and the National Labor Relations
Board (hereinafter NLRB or Board) 3 have balanced the property interests
of employers 4 against the organizational interests of labor and concluded
that employees have the right to distribute literature on the employer's
premises in nonworking areas during nonworking time and to solicit
support during nonworking time for purposes protected by Section 7,5
1 Section 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970), provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join or
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for
the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.
... (Emphasis added).
The right to self-organization ensures that employees may communicate with each
other and with union officials concerning the formation of labor unions, collective
bargaining, and other matters encompassed by Section 7. This right protects various
forms of organizational activity, including newspaper advertisements, mailings, radio
and television appeals, as well as solicitation and literature distribution conducted
both on and off the employer's premises. See Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407
U.S. 539, 542 (1972); NLRB v. United Aircraft Corp., 324 F.2d 128, 130 (2d Cir.
1963); Comment, NLRB v. Magnavox Co.: The Death Knell for Union Waivers of
Employee Rights to Distribute Literature, 60 VA. L. REV. 1073 (1974).
2 Solicitation and the distribution of literature on the employer's premises are the
most efficient means of contacting the entire work force. They are also likely to be
the most persuasive form of communication both because of the personal contact
involved and because the place of work is the one location where employees share
common interests and traditionally seek to persuade each other in matters affecting
the employment relation. See NLRB v. United Aircraft Corp., 324 F.2d 128,
130 (2d Cir. 1963); Gale Products, Div. of Outboard Marine Corp., 142 N.L.R.B.
1246, 1249 (1963), enforcement denied, 337 F.2d 390 (7th Cir. 1964).
3 The NLRB administers the National Labor Relations Act. 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1970).
4 Employers have the right, based on the common law and the fifth amendment,
to use and enjoy their property freely, and specifically to maintain discipline and
efficient plant operations. See NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956);
Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945); LeTourneau Co. of Georgia,
54 N.L.R.B. 1253 (1944).
5Stoddard-Quirk Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 615 (1962). See also NLRB v.
Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956); Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB,
324 U.S. 793 (1945); Walton Mfg. Co., 126 N.L.R.B. 697 (1960); Peyton Packing
Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 828 (1943).
Since the property rights of employers must yield only where necessary to facilitate
the exercise of employees' Section 7 rights, see Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407
U.S. 539 (1972); NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956), employees
only have the right to conduct solicitations and literature distributions which are
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unless special circumstances of production, discipline, or safety are pres-
ent.6 In NLRB v. Magnavox Co.,7 the Supreme Court held that unions do
not have the power to waive these employee rights. After discussing the
historical treatment accorded union waivers of employee solicitation-
distribution rights, this note will examine the Court's holding in Magnavox
and the policies behind its decision. This note will then explore the con-
clusions reached by subsequent judicial and NLRB decisions concerning
the types of solicitation and literature distribution which are immune
from union waiver. Finally, this note will suggest that unions must be
precluded from waiving any employee solicitation-distribution rights in
order to effectuate the central objectives of the nation's labor policy.
I. HISTORICAL TREATMENT OF
UNION WAIVERS
Prior to the Magnavox litigation, the courts and the NLRB harbored
three divergent views on whether unions could bargain away the
solicitation-distribution rights of employees.5 Drawing support from dicta in
pertinent to matters encompassed by Section 7 while they are on their employer's
premises. E.g., Eastex, Inc., 215 N.L.R.B. No. 58 (Dec. 4, 1974). This means that
employees can engage in solicitation and literature distribution concerning union
organizing campaigns, collective bargaining, representation elections, conditions of
employment, and other matters sufficiently related to the interests of employees. But
a literature distribution dealing solely with political propaganda, for example, is not
protected. Ford Motor Co., 221 N.L.R.B. No. 99 (Nov. 13, 1975).
The phrase "nonworking time" means time in which no work is performed
rather than unpaid time. Consequently, employees have the right to engage in self-
organizational activities during lunch and break periods even if they are paid for
this time. NLRB v. Armstrong Tire & Rubber Co., 262 F.2d 812 (5th Cir. 1959);
NLRB v. Essex Wire Corp., 245 F.2d 589 (9th Cir. 1957); NLRB v. Monarch Tool
Co., 210 F.2d 183 (6th Cir. 1954); Olin Indus. v. NLRB, 191 F.2d 613 (5th Cir.
1951). Employees also have the right to solicit support and distribute literature
before or after working hours. But if they are on the employer's premises more than
a reasonable period of time before or after their shift, they are considered "off-duty"
and normally do not possess these rights. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. NLRB, 472
F.2d 539 (8th Cir. 1973); Diamond Shamrock Co. v. NLRB, 443 F.2d 52 (3d Cir.
1971); Tri-County Medical Center, Inc., 222 N.L.R.B. No. 174 (Feb. 25, 1976);
G.T.E. Lenkurt, Inc., 204 N.L.R.B. 921 (1973).
The phrase "nonworking areas" includes such locations as parking lots, entrance
gates, lunchrooms, rest or break areas, restrooms, and the space around time clocks.
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. NLRB, 472 F.2d 539, 541 (8th Cir. 1973); Massey-
Ferguson, Inc., 211 N.L.R.B. No. 64, slip op. at 3, 4 (June 12, 1974); Stoddard-
Quirk Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 615, 620 (1962).6 See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. NLRB, 472 F.2d 539 (8th Cir. 1973);
Davison-Paxon Co., Div. of R.H. Macy v. NLRB, 462 F.2d 364 (5th Cir. 1972);
Fabri-Tek, Inc. v. NLRB, 352 F.2d 577 (8th Cir. 1968); NLRB v. Harrah's Club,
337 F.2d 177 (9th Cir. 1964); NLRB v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 277 F.2d 759 (5th
Cir. 1960), modifying 123 N.L.R.B. 747 (1959); Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. NLRB,
230 F.2d 357 (7th Cir. 1956); NLRB v. May Dep't Stores Co., 154 F.2d 533
(8th Cir. 1946), modifying 59 N.L.R.B. 976 (1944); United Parcel Serv., Inc.,
195 N.L.R.B. No. 77 (1972); Stuart Cooper, 136 N.L.R.B. 142 (1967); United
Aircraft Corp., 134 N.L.R.B. 1632 (1961).
7 415 U.S. 322 (1974).
8 The historical treatment of union waivers of employee organizational rights,
and the competing policy arguments in favor of the various positions taken by the
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early Board decisions,9 the Sixth and Seventh Circuits held that unions
had the power to waive solicitation-distribution rights for all employees. 10
These courts emphasized that judicial nullification of contractual waivers vio-
lates the basic premise of the nation's labor policy that industrial peace can
best be achieved by permitting unions to contract freely with management
concerning conditions of employment." Moreover, they viewed solicitation
and literature distribution on the employer's premises merely as convenient
methods of self-organization which could be waived if adequate alterna-
tive methods of communication were available. 12 In addition, the Sixth
Circuit justified its position by observing that other important Section 7
rights, including the right to strike, are waivable by unions. 13 This court
also noted that since unions usually receive a quid pro quo, such as use
of company bulletin boards, for waiving employee organizational rights,
Board and courts are discussed in Dereshinsky, The Solicitation and Distribution
Rules of the NLRB, 40 U. CIN. L. REV. 417 (1971); Note, Collectively Bargained
Waiver of Plant-Site Solicitation and Distribution, 56 IOWA L. REV. 152 (1970); Note,
Contractual Waiver by Labor Unions of Employees' Solicitation-Distribution Rights:
Time for a Resolution, 49 NOTRE DAME LAW. 920 (1974); Comment, Employee
Opposition to Incumbent Unions, 41 U. CI. L. REV. 190 (1973); Comment, Em-
ployees' Solicitation-Distribution Rights Supersede Contract Waiver, 26 U. FLA. L.
REV. 908 (1974); Comment, NLRB v. Magnavox Co.: The Death Knell for Union
Waivers of Employee Rights to Distribute Literature, 60 VA. L. REV. 1073 (1974).
9 In May Dep't Stores Co., 59 N.L.R.B. 976, 981-82 (1944), modified,
154 F.2d 533 (8th Cir. 1946) the Board noted that contracts negotiated by unions
not parties to that proceeding had effectively waived the solicitation rights of em-
ployees covered by the contracts. See also Clinton Foods, Inc., 112 N.L.R.B. 239,
263-64 (1955); Monolith Portland Cement Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 1358, 1396 (1951);
Fruitvale Canning Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 884, 885 (1950); W.T. Smith Lumber Co., 79
N.L.R.B. 606, 616 (1948); North American Aviation, Inc., 56 N.L.R.B. 959, 962
(1944). These decisions all involved organizational activities in support of the in-
cumbent union.
10 General Motors Corp. v. NLRB, 345 F.2d 516 (6th Cir. 1965), denying enforce-
ment 147 N.L.R.B. 509 (1964); Armco Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 344 F.2d 621 (6th Cir.
1965), denying enforcement 148 N.L.R.B. 1179 (1964); Gale Products, Div. of Out-
board Marine Corp. v. NLRB, 337 F.2d 390 (7th Cir. 1964), denying enforcement
142 N.L.R.B. 1246 (1963).
1 Armco Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 344 F.2d 621, 624 (6th Cir. 1965), denying en-
forcement 148 N.L.R.B. 1179 (1964); Gale Products, Div. of Outboard Marine
Corp. v. NLRB, 337 F.2d 390, 392 (7th Cir. 1964), denying enforcement 142
N.L.R.B. 1246 (1963). See generally H.K. Porter v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970);
NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952); NLRB v. Jones & Laugh-
lin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
12 Armco Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 344 F.2d 621, 625 (6th Cir. 1965), denying en-
forcement 148 N.L.R.B. 1179 (1964); Gale Products, Div. of Outboard Marine
Corp. v. NLRB, 337 F.2d 390, 392 (7th Cir. 1964), denying enforcement 142
N.L.R.B. 1246 (1963).
13 Armco Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 344 F.2d 621, 624 (6th Cir. 1965), denying en-
forcement 148 N.L.R.B. 1179 (1964). The Supreme Court has established that unions
can waive the following rights of employees: to refrain from paying a service fee
to the union, NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734 (1963); to strike, United
Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S.
574 (1960); to vote on a proposed contract, NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner
Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958); to refuse to cross picket lines, NLRB v. Rockaway
News Supply Co., 345 U.S. 71 (1953); to seniority, Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345
U.S. 330 (1953); and to bargain over management functions, NLRB v. American
Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952).
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nullification of contractual waivers gives unions an undeserved windfall. 14
In contrast, the NLRB, beginning with its decision in Gale Products,
Division of Outboard Marine Corp.,15 and the Fifth Circuit held that
unions could bargain away the solicitation-distribution rights of their sup-
porters but not of disaffected employees.16 The Board and the Fifth Circuit
arrived at this conclusion by balancing the interference with employees'
Section 7 rights against the desirability of preserving contractual freedom. 17
Concerned that unions might waive these rights merely to freeze out op-
positon rather than to obtain a quid pro quo for employees, they found
that the need to protect the freedom of workers to change their bargain-
ing representatives outweighed the policy considerations favoring con-
tractual freedom where the rights of disaffected employees were con-
cerned.' 8 The Fifth Circuit pointed out that waivers of the right to strike
merely limit a collective economic weapon, whereas waivers of the rights
to solicit support and to distribute literature encroach upon self-
organizational rights belonging to individual employees. 19 Concluding
that these personal rights were too fundamental to be waived, the court
noted that even waivers of the right to strike are not enforced where the
free selection of the bargaining agent would thereby be endangered. 20 The
NLRB observed that the presence of alternative methods of communica-
tion is relevant only in determining the privileges of non-employee union
organizers and not the rights of employees..2 1
Finally, embracing a view previously articulated in a dissenting opinion
by Board Member Jenkins, 22 the Eighth Circuit held that unions could not
14 See, e.g., Armco Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 344 F.2d 621, 625 (6th Cir. 1965), de-
nying enforcement 148 N.L.R.B. 1179 (1964).
15 142 N.L.R.B. 1246 (1963), enforcement denied, 337 F.2d 390 (7th Cir. 1964).
16 NLRB v. Mid-States Metal Products, Inc., 403 F.2d 702 (5th Cir. 1968), en-
forcing 156 N.L.R.B. 872 (1966); H. & F. Binch Co., 168 N.L.R.B. 929 (1967);
General Motors Corp., 158 N.L.R.B. 1723 (1966); Armco Steel Corp., 148 N.L.R.B.
1179 (1964), enforcement denied, 344 F.2d 621 (6th Cir. 1965); General Motors
Corp., 147 N.L.R.B. 509 (1964), enforcement denied, 345 F.2d 516 (6th Cir. 1965).
17 See NLRB v. Mid-States Metal Products, Inc., 403 F.2d 702, 704-05 (5th Cir.
1968), enforcing 156 N.L.R.B. 872 (1966); Gale Products, Div. of Outboard Marine
Corp., 142 N.L.R.B. 1246, 1249 (1963), enforcement denied, 337 F.2d 390 (7th Cir.
1964).
18 See NLRB v. Mid-States Metal Products, Inc., 403 F.2d 702, 705 (5th Cir.
1968), enforcing 156 N.L.R.B. 872 (1966); General Motors Corp., 158 N.L.R.B.
1723, 1726-27 (1966); Gale Products, Div. of Outboard Marine Corp., 142 N.L.R.B.
1246, 1249 (1963), enforcement denied, 337 F.2d 390 (7th Cir. 1964).
19 NLRB v. Mid-States Metal Products, Inc., 403 F.2d 702, 705-06 (5th Cir.
1968), enforcing 156 N.L.R.B. 872 (1966).
20 Id. See Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956).
21 H. & F. Binch Co., 168 N.L.R.B. 929, 935 (1967); Armco Steel Corp., 148
N.L.R.B. 1179, 1185 (1964), enforcement denied, 344 F.2d 621 (6th Cir. 1965).
This principle has been embraced by most circuit courts. See National Steel Corp. v.
NLRB, 415 F.2d 1231, 1233 (6th Cir. 1969); Republic Aluminum Co. v. NLRB,
394 F.2d 405 (5th Cir. 1968); United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO v. NLRB,
393 F.2d 661 (D.C. Cir. 1968); NLRB v. United Aircraft Corp., 324 F.2d 128 (2d
Cir. 1963); Time-O-Matic, Inc. v. NLRB, 264 F.2d 96 (7th Cir. 1959). Contra,
NLRB v. Rockwell Mfg. Co., 271 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1959).
22 General Motors Corp., 147 N.L.R.B. 509, 514 (1964) (Jenkins, dissenting opin-
ion), enforcement denied, 345 F.2d 516 (6th Cir. 1965).
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bargain away the solicitation-distribution rights of any employees. 23 The
Eighth Circuit and Jenkins concluded that these rights, whether exercised
on behalf of or in opposition to the incumbent union, were simply too
fundamental to the letter and spirit of the nation's labor policy to be
waived.2 4 Unlike the two-sided Gale Products approach, this position treated
all employees alike. 25
11. THE Magnavox DECISION
When Magnavox Co. 26 arose in 1972, the NLRB reassessed its views
and adopted the position advanced by the Eighth Circuit and Board Mem-
ber Jenkins. The Board found that the union representing the Magnavox
workers had impliedly waived the employees' distribution rights by agree-
ing to contract terms reserving broad rule-making powers to management
and by failing to challenge a rule promulgated by the employer which pro-
hibited the distribution of literature anywhere on company property. The
Board endorsed the reasoning of Gale Products, observing that the self-
organizational rights of individual employees deserve protection against
encroachment by either unions or employers. But it no longer perceived
any justification for giving more protection to the Section 7 right of em-
ployees to reject a bargaining agent than to the Section 7 right of em-
ployees to support their union. To guarantee all employees equal literature
distribution rights, the Board invalidated the union waiver with respect to
all workers.27
Although previous Board orders nullifying union waivers had been
phrased in terms of organizational activity related to the selection or re-
jection of the bargaining agent, in Magnavox the Board announced that
unions could not bargain away the rights of employees to distribute liter-
ature pertaining either to:
(1) the employees' selection or rejection of a labor organization
as the bargaining representative of the employees; or (2) other
matters related to the exercise by employees of their Section 7
rights.2 8
The Board added the caveat, however, that since it was concerned solely
with protecting the Section 7 rights of employees, its holding extended
23 International Ass'n of Machinists v. NLRB, 415 F.2d 113 (8th Cir. 1969),
modifying 171 N.L.R.B. 234 (1968).
24 Id. at 115; General Motors Corp., 147 N.L.R.B. 509, 514 (1964) (Jenkins, dis-
senting opinion), enforcement denied, 345 F.2d 516 (6th Cir. 1965). The Eighth
Circuit and Board Member Jenkins both failed to explain why they considered
employee solicitation-distribution rights to be more fundamental than other Section
7 rights.
25 The Sixth Circuit had criticized the Gale Products remedy, arguing that it
threatened to undermine industrial peace by creating distinctions between the rights
of different workers. Armco Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 344 F.2d 621, 624 (6th Cir.
1965), denying enforcement 148 N.L.R.B. 1179 (1964).
26 195 N.L.R.B. 265 (1972), enforced, 415 U.S. 322 (1974).
27 Id. at 266.
28 Id. (emphasis- added).
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only to the distribution of purely organizational materials and not to the
distribution of union institutional literature.
2 9
The Sixth Circuit refused to enforce the NLRB order, reemphasizing
its position that unions have the power to waive the self-organizational
rights of all employees.30 In a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court reversed
the Sixth Circuit and reinstated the NLRB order.3 1 Recognizing that
unions might bargain away the solicitation-distribution rights of employees
merely to stifle opposition, the majority and dissent32 agreed that the
rights of disaffected employees had to be protected in order to ensure
the free selection of collective bargaining representatives. But the majority
went further, holding that the solicitation-distribution rights of union sup-
porters also had to be protected from contractual waiver because "em-
ployees supporting the union have as secure § 7 rights as those in
opposition. '33 The dissent argued that this extension was an unwarranted
infringement upon the freedom of unions to contract with management
concerning conditions of employment. 34
The majority did not elaborate on the rationale behind its decision to
protect the solicitation-distribution rights of all employees from union
waiver, leaving room for two divergent interpretations. The Magnavox
decision can be understood as a reaction against the discriminatory
treatment of workers permitted in Gale Products.35 To ensure the free
selection of bargaining agents, representation elections must be conducted
under "laboratory conditions," where employees are exposed to all
viewpoints and are able to make a reasoned choice free from any inter-
ference, restraint, or coercion. 36 Allowing only those employees opposed
to the incumbent union to engage in organizational activities on the em-
ployer's premises clearly places supporters of the union at a disadvantage
and permits an imbalance in the presentation of viewpoints, impairing
the integrity of the entire election process.
The Magnavox decision can also be interpreted as based on the rationale
29 Id. The Board did not elaborate on the distinction between institutional and or-
ganizational literature, mentioning this caveat only in footnote 9 of its opinion. By
institutional literature, the Board probably meant literature prepared or sponsored
by unions. See notes 75-76 and accompanying text inIra.
30 Magnavox Co. v. NLRB, 474 F.2d 1269 (6th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 415 U.S. 322
(1974). After this adverse ruling, but prior to the Supreme Court's decision, the
NLRB twice reaffirmed its position. Samsonite Corp., 206 N.L.R.B. 343 (1973);
Sterling Faucet Co., 203 N.L.R.B. 1031 (1973).
31 NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U.S. 322 (1974).
32 The dissenting Justices, Stewart, Powell, and Rehnquist, concurred in part with
the majority and rejected the reasoning of the Sixth Circuit. 415 U.S. at 327.
33 415 U.S. at 326.
34 The dissent indicated however, that it might be necessary to completely nullify
a union waiver where exceptional circumstances made the balanced presentation of
viewpoints during a representation controversy impossible under the two-sided Gale
Products approach. Id. at 330-31.
35 See Comment, NLRB v. Magnavox Co.: The Death Knell for Union Waivers of
Employee Rights to Distribute Literature, 60 VA. L. REV. 1073 (1974).
36 See Sewell Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 66, 69-70 (1962); General Shoe Corp., 77
N.L.R.B. 124, 127 (1948).
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that solicitation-distribution rights belong to individual employees rather
than to unions, and that these rights are simply too fundamental to be
waivedA7 The rights of employees to solicit support and to distribute
literature at their place of work are inextricably tied to the free exercise
of their Section 7 rights to select bargaining representatives and engage
in concerted activity for mutual aid or protection. Since Section 7 se-
cures these rights to employees, unions have no authority to encroach
upon them.
The ambiguity regarding the Court's rationale for invalidating union
waivers with respect to all employees is compounded by uncertainty con-
cerning the scope of Magnavox. The Court failed to delineate which types
of solicitation and literature distribution3 8 are immune from union waiver.3 9
The majority did not reiterate the NLRB's statement that unions cannot
waive the rights of employees to distribute literature pertaining to the
selection or rejection of the bargaining agent or to other matters related
to the exercise by employees of their Section 7 rights. 40 Nor did the major-
ity explicitly approve the Board's distinction between organizational and
institutional literature. 41 Since the Court enforced the Board's order, the
majority's silence on these matters could be construed as an implied en-
dorsement of the Board's positions. Indeed, the dissent presumed that
the majority had agreed with the Board's institutional literature exception.
The dissent observed, however, that the Court's decision dealt only with the
rights of employees to distribute literature relating to the selection, rejec-
tion, or displacement of the bargaining agent.42
The scope attributed to the Magnavox decision should depend partly
on the rationale behind the majority opinion. If the Magnavox decision is a
reaction against discriminatory policies which impair the integrity of the
election process, unions would still be permitted to bargain away the
solicitation-distribution rights of all employees so long as organizational
activities related to the selection or rejection of the bargaining agent, or
conducted during the period immediately preceding representation elec-
tions, are exempted. 43 Moreover, no distinction could be made between
the distribution of organizational and institutional literature, since the
latter may be the only effective means of presenting the incumbent union's
point of view during a representation controversy.
37 See Comment, Employees' Solicitation-Distribution Rights Supersede Contract
Waiver, 26 U. FLA. L. REV. 908 (1974). Employee solicitation-distribution rights
are fundamental because other Section 7 rights can only be fully realized if em-
ployees are able to communicate freely with each other.
38 The majority seemed to use the terms "solicitation" and "distribution" inter-
changeably, implying that unions cannot encroach on either of these employee
rights. 415 U.S. at 324-25. In contrast, the dissent was careful only to refer to the
distribution of literature. 415 U.S. at 327-30.
30See the discussion in note 5 supra, concerning the types of solicitation and
literature distribution which employees have the right to conduct in the workplace.4
oSee note 28 and accompanying text supra.
41 See note 29 and accompanying text supra.
42 415 U.S. at 329.
43 See International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. NLRB, 415 F.2d
113, 115 (8th Cir. 1969), modifying 171 N.L.R.B. 234 (1968), where the Eighth
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In contrast, if the Magnavox decision is a defense of fundamental,
personal rights, then any waiver of employee solicitation-distribution rights
is improper, regardless of its breadth. While a union may be allowed to
waive its own rights as an organization to distribute institutional litera-
ture,44 it would not be able to interfere with the right of individual em-
ployees to distribute materials, including those sponsored by the union.
The Supreme Court may have been deliberately vague about the scope
and rationale of its decision. Cognizant of the delicate interaction between
employee, union, and employer rights in this area, the Court may have
preferred to give the NLRB, with its superior expertise in labor relations,
the maximum freedom to implement this new policy on a case by case
basis. Moreover, the Court may have wanted to avoid rendering a defini-
tive statement until the Board and the lower courts had been given an
opportunity to wrestle with the problems posed by the application of
Magnavox to concrete factual situations. 45 Post-Magnavox decisions should
be examined with this in mind.
III. PosT-Magnavox DECISIONS
A. Union Waivers and Section 7
NLRB decisions since Magnavox have not explored the rationale be-
hind the Supreme Court's conclusion that the solicitation-distribution
rights of all employees are immune from union waiver. Nevertheless, these
decisions have interpreted Magnavox to give broad protection to the self-
organizational rights of employees. 46 The Board has construed the Supreme
Circuit left open the question whether a partial waiver would be permissible. See also
United Aircraft Corp. v. NLRB, 440 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1971); Mason & Hanger-Silas
Mason Co. v. NLRB, 405 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1968).
44 If the NLRB's institutional literature exception is narrowly interpreted to
encompass only distributions of institutional materials by official representatives of
unions, then it would be consistent with the "individual rights" interpretation of the
Magnavox decision.
45 The fact that three Justices dissented from the majority's broad language sug-
gests that future changes in the composition of the Court might bring about a re-
trenchment in its position. The retirement of Justice Douglas, who wrote the
majority opinion, and the appointment of Justice Stevens to take his place has
probably strengthened the position of the dissenters since Stevens was a member of
the Seventh Circuit which had permitted unions to waive the organizational rights
of all employees. Since all of the Justices agreed that unions cannot waive the
solicitation-distribution rights of their opponents, this question would seem to be
permanently resolved. While a return to the Gale Products approach is conceivable, a
new Court majority could also interpret Magnavox as being concerned only with
the impact of the discriminatory Gale Products remedy on the integrity of the
election process, and thus limit the decision, as the dissenters suggested, to the
distribution of literature pertaining to the selection, rejection or displacement of a
bargaining agent. See note 42 supra.
46 While most of the Board decisions have dealt with literature distribution, several
have also invoked the authority of Magnavox to protect the solicitation rights of
employees. Graham Ford, Inc., 218 N.L.R.B. No. 148 (June 30, 1975); Eastex, Inc.,
215 N.L.R.B. No. 58 (Dec. 4, 1974).
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Court's decision as an implied endorsement of its order in Magnavox. 47
Consequently, the Board has concluded that unions are precluded from
bargaining away the rights of employees to distribute any organizational
literature which pertains to matters encompassed by Section 7, and not
simply literature which concerns the selection or rejection of the bargain-
ing representative. 48 For example, in Yellow Cab, Inc.49 the Board de-
clared that under the Supreme Court's decision unions cannot bargain
away the "general right of employees under Section 7 of the Act to dis-
tribute literature in support of collective bargaining or other mutual aid
or protection. . . . "-50 Likewise, in Massey-Ferguson, Inc.51 the Board inter-
preted Magnavox to hold that unions cannot waive the right of employees
to distribute literature "concerning their Section 7 interests.1 52
Applying this expansive interpretation of the Supreme Court's decision,
the NLRB has protected the distribution of diverse types of literature
from union waiver. The Board has found that literature distributions di-
rectly concerned with working conditions are pertinent to the Section 7
rights of employees and consequently are immune from union waiver. In
Ford Motor Co.53 it stated that a union could not bargain away an em-
ployee's right to distribute leaflets discussing, among other things, the
issue of forced overtime in the employer's plant.54 Similarly, the Board held
4 7 See Ford Motor Co., 221 N.L.R.B. No. 99, slip op. at 6 (Nov. 13, 1975);
General Motors Corp., 212 N.L.R.B. No. 45, slip op. at 5 (June 28, 1974), modified,
512 F.2d 447 (6th Cir. 1975). See also Ford Motor Co. (Sterling Plant), N.L.R.B.
Ad. L. Decision No. JD-427-74, slip op. at 11 (June 21, 1974). The Board
has generally patterned its orders in post-Magnavox decisions after the Magnavox
order. See note 28 supra.
48 See Ford Motor Co., 221 N.L.R.B. No. 99, slip op. at 6, 7 (Nov. 13, 1975);
Dreis & Krump Mfg., Inc., 221 N.L.R.B. No. 46, slip op. at 5 (Nov. 4, 1975); Mas-
sey-Ferguson, Inc., 211 N.L.R.B. No. 64 (June 12, 1974); Yellow Cab, Inc., 210
N.L.R.B. 568 (1974); McDonnell Douglas Corp., 210 N.L.R.B. 280 (1974). See also
Ford Motor Co. (Sterling Plant), N.L.R.B. Ad. L. Decision No. JD-427-74, slip op.
at 10-12 (June 21, 1974).
In Ford Motor Co., 221 N.L.R.B. No. 99 (Nov. 13, 1975), the Board found that a
rule prohibiting unauthorized distribution of literature was invalid even though it
specifically exempted the distribution of literature pertaining to the selection or
rejection of a union as the bargaining agent. In McDonnell Douglas Corp., 210
N.L.R.B. No. 29 (Apr. 29, 1974), the Board dismissed as irrelevant the fact that no
representation election could be held in the factory for twelve months.
49210 N.L.R.B. 568 (1974).
50 Id. at 569.
51211 N.L.R.B. No. 64 (June 12, 1974).
52 Id., slip op. at 2, 3. See also Ford Motor Co. (Sterling Plant), N.L.R.B. Ad.
L. Decision No. JD-427-74, slip op.' at 9 (June 21, 1974), where it was observed
that Magnavox protects the rights of employees to distribute literature "for purposes
protected by Section 7 of the Act."
53 221 N.L.R.B. No. 99 (Nov. 13, 1975). Although the Board found that the
union had not in fact waived the distribution rights of employees, it went on to
consider whether the purported waiver would be valid under Magnavox in any
event. Id., slip op. at 5, 6.
54 The leaflets discussed general economic and political subjects as well as the
issue of forced overtime. The Board reaffirmed its position that the presence of
social comment in literature does not detract from the conclusion that its distribution
is protected by Section 7 and hence immune from union waivers so long as some
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in Dreis & Krump Manufacturing, Inc.55 that a union could not waive an
employee's right to distribute leaflets criticizing the poor quality of super-
vision by the employer's foremen as it related to training, safety, and
discipline.
The Board has also found that literature distributions dealing with in-
ternal union affairs are pertinent to matters encompassed by Section 7
and, therefore, protected under the Magnavox decision. In McDonnell
Douglas Corp.56 the Board determined that because employees were com-
pelled to pay dues under a union shop agreement, the distribution of
leaflets opposing an increase in dues was directly related to conditions
of employment and, consequently, immune from union waiver. Further,
in Ford Motor Co. (Sterling Plant)57 an administrative law judge58 stated
that a union could not waive an employee's right to distribute leaflets
urging his fellow workers to attend the next union meeting in order to de-
mand an additional committeeman allegedly due them, because the dis-
tribution was an attempt to spur the union to more effective representation
and therefore was pertinent to the Section 7 rights of employees. 59
The Board has even invoked the authority of Magnavox to protect
organizational activities on the fringes of Section 7, holding that unions
have no power to bargain away the rights of employees to distribute liter-
ature which only indirectly concerns conditions of employment.60 In
portion of the material pertains to the employment relation. Id., slip op. at 4, 7. See
also Eastex, Inc., 215 N.L.R.B. No. 58, slip op. at 10 (Dec. 4, 1974); Samsonite Corp.,
206 N.L.R.B. 343, 346 (1973).
55 221 N.L.R.B. No. 46 (Nov. 4, 1975). The Board questioned whether this right
had actually been waived by the union.
56210 N.L.R.B. 280 (1974).
57 N.L.R.B. Ad. L. Decision No. JD-427-74, slip op. at 11, 12 (June 21, 1974).
58 Administrative law judges are part of the NLRB's staff. They conduct the
initial hearings on unfair labor practice charges and must issue a report and recom-
mended order based on their findings. This recommended order can then be appealed
to the NLRB. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1970); 29 C.F.R. § 101.10-.12 (1975).
59 The administrative law judge first determined that the union had not in fact
waived the distribution rights of employees, but then also considered whether the
purported waiver would be valid under Magnavox in any event. Ford Motor Co.
(Sterling Plant), N.L.R.B. Ad. L. Decision No. JD-427-74, slip op. at 12 (June 21,
1974). No exceptions were filed to the judge's report, and consequently his findings
and conclusions were adopted by the NLRB on July 26, 1974, pursuant to Section
10(c) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1970).
While the precedential value of administrative law judge decisions is minimal,
this opinion does reveal the analysis of union waivers now being made by the ad-
ministrative agency in charge of implementing the nation's labor policy.
60 The expansive interpretation of Section 7 advanced by the Board in waiver cases
comports with its approach in other areas where it has also held that concerted
activities related only indirectly to conditions of employment are nevertheless pro-
tected by Section 7. See, e.g., Russell Sportswear Corp., 197 N.L.R.B. 1116 (1972);
G & W Elec. Specialty Co., 154 N.L.R.B. 1136 (1965), enforcement denied in
part, 360 F.2d 873 (7th Cir. 1966). However, the Seventh Circuit has rejected this
viewpoint, holding that concerted activities must be at least directly concerned
with the employment relation to be encompassed within Section 7. Id. One author
has suggested that in deciding whether certain concerted activity is protected by Sec-
tion 7, the courts and the NLRB should balance the coerciveness of the activity
against the immediacy of its objectives to the employment relation. See Haggard,
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Massey-Ferguson, Inc.61 the Board concluded that a newsletter distributed
by a dissident caucus was pertinent to matters encompassed by the Section
7 rights of the Massey-Ferguson employees, even though it made no refer-
ence to the company, its employees, or the local union representing them.
Noting that the same international union represented workers at Massey-
Ferguson and Chrysler, and that contract negotiations with Massey-
Ferguson were underway at the time, the Board decided that because a
portion of the newsletter warned that the terms of a contract recently
negotiated with Chrysler would set a disadvantageous pattern for other
negotiations, its distribution was sufficiently related to conditions of
employment at Massey-Ferguson to warrant nullification of the union's
waiver.
602
Likewise, in Yellow Cab, Inc. 63 the Board held that the distribution of
leaflets urging employees to attend a demonstration in support of workers
striking against another employer was immune from union waiver. Be-
cause the leaflet distribution attempted to promote labor solidarity against
an alleged union-busting combination, the Board found that it concerned
the Section 7 right of Yellow Cab employees to engage in concerted
activities for mutual aid and protection, even though the demonstration
was not being sponsored by their union. 4
It is unclear whether the courts will interpret Magnavox as expansively
as the NLRB. The only judicial decision dealing with union waiver of
Picket Line Observance as a Protected Concerted Activity, 53 N.C.L. REV. 43,
102-06 (1974).
Despite this uncertainty about the proper standard to be applied in deciding
whether concerted activities come within the scope of Section 7, the Board's de-
terminations that the distributions in Massey-Ferguson, Inc. and Yellow Cab, Inc.
(see notes 61-64 and accompanying text infra) were pertinent to Section 7 can be
justified on more general authority. It is well established that concerted activities
need not be sponsored by a union to be protected by Section 7. NLRB v. Washing-
ton Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962); NLRB v. Guernsey-Muskingum Co-op, Inc.,
285 F.2d 8 (6th Cir. 1960); NLRB v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 167 F.2d 983
(7th Cir. 1948); Ohio Oil Co., 92 N.L.R.B. 1597 (1951). Moreover, numerous
Board and court decisions have indicated that, because the generation of labor
solidarity benefits employees, concerted activities in support of another employer's
workers can also be encompassed within Section 7. Texaco, Inc. v. NLRB, 462
F.2d 812 (3d Cir. 1972), enforcing 189 N.L.R.B. 343 (1971); NLRB v. City Yellow
Cab Co., 344 F.2d 575 (6th Cir. 1965); NLRB v. Peter Cailler Kohler Swiss Choco-
lates Co., 130 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1942); Russell Sportswear Corp., 197 N.L.R.B.
1116 (1972); Washington State Serv. Employees' State Council No. 18, 188 N.L.R.B.
957 (1971); General Elec. Co., 169 N.L.R.B. 1101 (1968), enforced, 411 F.2d
750 (9th Cir. 1969).
61 211 N.L.R.B. No. 64 (June 12, 1974).
62 As further justification for its decision, the NLRB pointed to another article
in the newsletter which analyzed the role played by local union leadership in the
relationship between individual members and the international union. In upholding
the right of employees to distribute this particular newsletter, the Board rejected as
irrelevant the presence of reasonable alternative means of communication. Id.,
slip op. at 2, 3.
63 210 N.L.R.B. 568 (1974).
64 The NLRB had previously indicated in Samsonite Corp., 206 N.L.R.B. 343,
346-48 (1973), that organizational activity could be protected by Section 7 and
hence immune from union waiver even if it was not union activity.
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employee solicitation-distribution rights since the Supreme Court's de-
cision is General Motors Corp. v. NLRB. 65 In this case, the Sixth Circuit
held that Magnavox precludes unions from bargaining away the right of
employees to distribute literature concerning candidates for union office
because
the election of officers has a significant bearing on the character
of a union and hence contributes to the selection or rejection of
the union as the employees' bargaining representative. 66
The above language may simply reflect the fact that the Sixth Circuit was
not obliged to adopt a broader interpretation of Magnavox in order to
protect this particular literature distribution. However, the court's past
endorsement of union waivers67 suggests that it may prefer to interpret
Magnavox more narrowly and invalidate union waivers only when they
impinge at least indirectly on the employees' choice of a bargaining
representative. 68
Since many factors "contribute" to the selection or rejection of a union
as the bargaining agent, the approach adopted by the Sixth Circuit could
be used to protect other types of organizational activity. But the NLRB's
interpretation of Magnavox represents a more expansive and straightfor-
ward method of giving protection to the solicitation-distribution rights of
employees. Indeed, by construing the Supreme Court's decision to protect
any organizational solicitation or literature distribution which is pertinent
to matters encompassed by Section 7, the Board has made the question of
union waivers largely irrelevant. Employees have the right to solicit sup-
port and distribute literature on their employer's premises only for pur-
poses protected by Section 7.69 Consequently, under the Board's expansive
interpretation of Magnavox, the question of whether unions can waive the
right of employees to conduct a particular solicitation or literature distribu-
tion coincides with the question whether employees possess this right in
the first place. Both questions turn on the same standard: whether the
activity is pertinent to the Section 7 rights of employees. The Board made
this apparent in McDonnell Douglas Corp.70 where it observed that the first
65 512 F.2d 447 (6th Cir. 1975), modifying 211 N.L.R.B. No. 123 (June 25, 1974).
661d. at 448. The Board advanced a similar rationale, but also noted that the
right to oppose the reelection of incumbent union officials is encompassed by Section
7. 211 N.L.R.B. No. 123, slip op. at 8, 9 (June 25, 1974), modified, 512 F.2d 447
(6th Cir. 1975).
67 See note 10 supra.
68 The court refused to enforce that portion of the NLRB order which referred to
other matters pertaining to the employees' Section 7 rights. (Beginning with Magna-
vox, Board orders nullifying union waivers have generally contained this language.
See notes 28, 47-48 and accompanying text supra.) However, the Sixth Circuit ob-
served that this portion of the order did not "correspond to violations actually found,"
and thus did not expressly reject the Board's expansive interpretation of the Magnavox
decision. 512 F.2d 447, 448 (6th Cir. 1975), modifying 211 N.L.R.B. No. 123 (June
25, 1974).
60 See note 5 and accompanying text supra.
70 210 N.L.R.B. 280 (1974). The Board embraced the same approach in several
other decisions. See Ford Motor Co., 221 N.L.R.B. No. 99, slip op. at 7 (Nov. 13,
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question to be answered was whether the distribution was pertinent to
matters encompassed by Section 7. Finding the requisite nexus between
the literature distribution and Section 7, it concluded that both the union
and the employer were precluded from interfering with the activity.
The Board has left unions with little power over employee solicitation-
distribution rights. If a particular solicitation or literature distribution is
pertinent to matters encompassed within Section 7, then neither the union
nor the employer can encroach upon the right of employees to conduct
it in the workplace. But if the solicitation or literature distribution is not
pertinent to Section 7, then the employer can unilaterally prohibit it,71
leaving the union with literally no employee right to waive. While the
employer may wish to give its prohibition of the unprotected activity
added force by incorporating it into a collective bargaining agreement, the
union would be endorsing the employer's rule rather than bargaining
away an employee right over which it had some control.
The Board's expansive interpretation of the Magnavox decision is con-
sistent with the view that solicitation and literature distribution are funda-
mental, personal rights belonging to individual employees rather than to
unions. 2 At the very least, it indicates that these rights are crucial to the
effectuation of all Section 7 rights, and not simply the employees' choice
of a bargaining representative.
B. Institutional Literature
Although the NLRB has relied on the Magnavox decision to give broad
protection to the distribution of organizational literature, it has main-
tained that unions may still bargain away the rights of employees to dis-
tribute union institutional literature. This exception was first suggested by
a footnote in the Board's Magnavox opinion.73 Subsequent decisions have
reiterated this distinction without elaborating on its meaning. 4 The only
1975); Massey-Ferguson, Inc. 211 N.L.R.B. No. 64, slip op. at 2 (June 12, 1974).
The Board's decision in Ford Motor Co. is particularly instructive. Although it
found that a literature distribution dealing with the issue of forced overtime was
pertinent to Section 7 and hence immune from contractual waiver, at the same time
the Board held that the distribution of a newsletter discussing the political en-
dorsements of labor unions and calling for the formation of a true workers' party
was not encompassed by Section 7 and therefore was capable of being prohibited
unilaterally by the employer. 221 N.L.R.B. No. 99, slip op. at 8 (Nov. 13, 1975).
71 See note 5 supra.
72 See note 37 and accompanying text supra.
73 See note 29 and accompanying text supra. The dissent in the Supreme Court
later endorsed this notion without adding any further explanation. See note 42 and
accompanying text supra.
74 See General Motors Corp., 212 N.L.R.B. No. 45, slip op. at 5 (June 28, 1974),
modified, 512 F.2d 447 (6th Cir. 1975); Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 211 N.L.R.B. No.
64, slip op. at 3 (June 12, 1974); McDonnell Douglas Corp., 210 N.L.R.B. 280,
281 (1974); Samsonite Corp., 206 N.L.R.B. 343, 347 (1973).
One reason for the absence of any detailed analysis of the institutional-organiza-
tional distinction is that the Board has not yet been confronted with a case involving
the distribution of literature determined to be "institutional." Hence, the distinction
is so far established only by dicta.
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attempt to define institutional literature occurred in Ford Motor Co.
(Sterling Plant),75 where the administrative law judge concluded that it
meant "material prepared or sponsored by the incumbent labor organiza-
tion."7 6
While Board decisions have failed to delineate clearly the distinction
between institutional and organizational literature, they have indicated
what types of literature will not be considered institutional. So long as
the literature is critical of the incumbent union or its policies, it will not
be characterized as institutional even though it deals with purely internal
union matters, 77 is issued regularly, 78 or is distributed by a minor local
union official. 79 These decisions indicate that the institutional literature
exception is only a narrow caveat to the Board's general policy against
union waivers.
No matter how narrowly this exception is defined, however, the wisdom
of distinguishing between institutional and organizational literature is
open to doubt. It is exceedingly difficult to draw a clear line between the
two types of materials. The amount of technical and financial assistance
rendered by the union in the preparation of the literature, the identity or
positions of the people involved in its distribution, and even the subject
matter and perspective contained in the material all have to be considered
in determining the institutional character of literature.8 0 While arbitrary
rules could be formulated to make enforcement of the institutional-
organizational distinction manageable, such rules would lead to inequitable
results and would probably encourage unions to alter their distribution
techniques in order to circumvent the restrictions.
Moreover, permitting unions to bargain away the rights of employees
to distribute institutional literature conflicts with both of the rationales
for the Magnavox decision. If Magnavox is interpreted as resting on the
75 N.L.R.B. Ad. L. Decision No. JD-427-74 (June 21, 1974).
76 Id., slip op. at 11.
77 General Motors Corp., 211 N.L.R.B. No. 123 (June 25, 1974), modified, 512
F.2d 447 (6th Cir. 1975); McDonnell Douglas Corp., 210 N.L.R.B. 280 (1974);
Ford Motor Co. (Sterling Plant), N.L.R.B. Ad. L. Decision No. JD-427-74
(June 21, 1974).
78 Samsonite Corp., 206 N.L.R.B. 343 (1973).
79 Ford Motor Co. (Sterling Plant), N.L.R.B. Ad. L. Decision No. JD-427-74
(June 21, 1974).
80 Difficulties are bound to arise when these factors point to disparate conclusions.
For example, an interesting question would have been presented in Massey-Ferguson,
Inc. if the incumbent administration of the local union had sponsored the distri-
bution of leaflets attacking the international union's settlement with Chrysler. Whether
local union funds and equipment were used to prepare the leaflets, and whether the
officers distributed the leaflets in the course of their official duties would be important
considerations in deciding if the material was in fact institutional. Cf. Retail Clerks
Union, Local 648 v. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, 299 F. Supp. 1012 (D.D.C. 1969),
where the court held that several local unions did not violate the provisions of the
Landrum-Griffin Act which prohibit unions from spending money collected from
dues to support the candidacy of any person for union office when they contributed
money from their treasuries to a committee formed for the purpose of attempting
to get their international union's recent election declared invalid.
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premise that the distribution of literature is a fundamental right belonging
to individual employees, then unions should have no authority to en-
croach upon this right irrespective of the nature of the material being
distributed. The individual employee should be free to distribute any
literature which he or she desires. 81 Since workers supporting an incum-
bent union will look toward it for official position statements, any waiver
of the right to distribute material sponsored by the union will also cripple
the ability of workers to engage in organizational activities.
If, on the other hand, Magnavox is perceived as an effort by the Court
to ensure the free flow of ideas and opinions that is crucial to the mainte-
nance of a "laboratory conditions" environment for representation elec-
tions, then unions should not be able to impinge upon the integrity of the
election process by agreeing to the exclusion of institutional literature.
Especially where opponents of the incumbent union are aided by an
organized caucus or rival union, supporters of the incumbent union must
have access to its institutional resources in order to ensure a balanced
presentation of viewpoints. It makes no difference that the incumbent
union may in a sense be responsible for placing itself in a disadvantageous
position; the public interest in promoting the free selection of collective
bargaining representatives transcends the interests of the parties immedi-
ately involved.8 2
IV. UNION WAIVERS AND FREE SPEECH
The NLRB and the courts should eliminate all union waivers of em-
ployee solicitation-distribution rights because they are inconsistent with
the central objectives of American labor policy. The basic purpose Of the
National Labor Relations Act is to promote industrial peace by granting
workers a measure of control over their representatives and working con-
ditions.8 3 Convinced that the ideal of industrial self-determination can
only be achieved through a democratic labor movement,8 4 Congress sub-
sequently enacted the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act
(LMRDA). 85 Dealing primarily with the union-member relationship,8 6
81 However, from this perspective a union should still be able to bargain away its
own right as an organization to distribute institutional literature. See note 44 and
accompanying text supra.
82 In Sterling Faucet Co., 203 N.L.R.B. 1031 (1973) the Board held that an in-
cumbent union was not estopped from raising the existence of an overly broad no-
distribution rule in its collective bargaining agreement as an objection to a represen-
tation election which it lost. Because the rule had impinged upon the employee's
freedom of choice in the election, the NLRB ordered a new election even though
this gave the culpable party, the incumbent union, a "second bite at the apple."
83 See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970); Comment, Employee Opposition to Incumbent
Unions, 41 U. CHLI. L. REV. 190, 198 (1973).
84 See Navarro v. Gannon, 385 F.2d 512, 518-19 (2d Cir. 1967); Beaird & Player,
Free Speech and the Landrum-Griffin Act, 25 ALA. L. REV. 577, 580 (1973); Cox,
Internal Affairs of Labor Unions Under the Labor Reform Act of 1959, 58 MICH. L.
REV. 819, 830 (1960).
85 29 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. (1970).
86 See Cox, supra note 84, at 852.
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this statute contains a "Bill of Rights"87 for union members which is in-
tended to encourage and protect union democracy by assuring union
members rights similar to those secured to citizens by virtue of the Con-
stitution.8 In particular, section 101 (a) (2) of the "Bill of Rights" guar-
antees union members the right of free speech.8 9 This section reflects the
belief that union democracy, like political democracy, can only flourish
where there is full freedom to dissent and to criticize. 90
Although section 101(a)(2) is basically designed to prevent unions
from infringing upon the freedom of employees to discuss the management
of their union at union meetings, it also declares that union members have
the right "to express any views, arguments, or opinions . "..."91 The
courts have interpreted this language to mean that the protection afforded
by section 101(a) (2) extends to speech dealing with subjects other than
intra-union matters92 and to speech uttered outside the confines of meet-
ings in local union halls.93 Moreover, it is clear that section 101 (a) (2)
encompasses the dissemination of written materials as well as pure speech.9 4
87 Subchapter II of the LMRDA is entitled, "Bill of Rights of Memb:!rs of Labor
Organizations." This portion of the Act secures five basic rights, including the right
of free speech, to all union members. 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(l)-(5) (1970).
88 See Navarro v. Gannon, 385 F.2d 512, 518 (2d Cir. 1967); Schuchardt v. Mill-
wrights & Mach. Erectors Local Union No. 2834, 380 F.2d 795, 797 (10th Cir.
1967); Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, Rank & File Comm. v. Amalga-
mated Clothing Workers of America, Philadelphia Joint Bd., 334 F. Supp. 760,
762 (E.D. Pa. 1971), afl'd, 473 F.2d 1303 (3d Cir. 1973).
89 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2) (1970). This section provides:
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND ASSEMBLY-
Every member of any labor organization shall have the right to meet
and assemble freely with other members; and to express any views,
arguments, or opinions; and to express at meetings of the labor or-
ganization his views upon candidates in an election of the labor organi-
zation or upon any business properly before the meeting....
90 See Navarro v. Gannon, 385 F.2d 512, 519 (2d Cir. 1967). Unions have been
characterized as quasi-governmental bodies; see Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R.,
323 U.S. 192, 198 (1944); Note, May a Union Bargain Away an Employee's Right
of Free Speech?, 44 NEB. L. REV. 645, 651-55 (1965); and union democracy com-
pared to political democracy; see Beaird, supra note 84, at 580; Cox, supra note 84,
at 830. Extending this analogy, the solicitation-distribution rights of employees may
be compared with the first amendment rights which citizens enjoy in that both are
crucial to the realization of a vital democracy.
91 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2) (1970).
9 2 See Farnum v. Kurtz, 2 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 81 Cal. Rptr. 924 (1969). See also
Kuebler v. Cleveland Lithographers & Photoengravers Union Local 24-P, 473 F.2d
359 (6th Cir. 1973); Rosen v. Painters Dist. Council 9, 50 CCH LAB. CAS. 19,245
(S.D.N.Y. 1964); Mitchell v. Machinists, 196 Cal. App. 2d 796, 16 Cal. Rptr. 813
(1961).
93 See Fulton Lodge No. 2 of the Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers,
AFL-CIO v. Nix, 415 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1969); Yanity v. Benware, 376 F.2d 197
(2d Cir. 1967); Deacon v. International Union of Operating Engineers, Local No.
12, 273 F. Supp. 169 (C.D. Cal. 1967); Graham v. Soloner, 220 F. Supp. 711 (E.D.
Pa. 1963); 105 CONG. REc. 6718 (1959) (remarks of Sen. McClellan); Cox, supra
note 84, at 834.
94 See International Bhd. of Boilermakers, Iron Shipbuilders, Blacksmiths, Forgers
& Helpers v. Rafferty, 348 F.2d 307 (9th Cir. 1965); Farowitz v. Associated Musicians
of Greater New York, Local 802, 330 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1964); Salzhandler v.
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Given this expansive construction of the LMRDA's free speech provisions,
it is apparent that the unions cannot directly infringe upon the freedom of
workers to solicit support and distribute literature in the workplace. Since
it is incongruous to permit unions to accomplish through agreement with
management what they are prohibited from doing alone, union waivers
of employee solicitation-distribution rights could also be deemed to violate
section 101(a)(2). 95 At the very least, union waivers of these self-
organizational rights contradict the values and objectives embodied in
this section. To truly effectuate the declared congressional policy of in-
dustrial self-determination through a democratic labor movement, work-
ers must have the freedom to express their opinions, whether favorable
or adverse to the incumbent union, through solicitation and literature
distribution conducted on the employer's premises, as well as through
union hall debates.
Protecting freedom of expression by employees, in the workplace or
in union halls, has certain costs. Besides weakening the authority wielded
by unions as the exclusive representative of workers in a particular bar-
gaining unit,96 it also encourages the proliferation of dissident activities
which may foster instability and demagogy in the labor movement. 97 The
net result of these two tendencies is that it will be more difficult for labor
and management to reach agreement through negotiation rather than
industrial warfare. 9s However, by incorporating the "Bill of Rights" for
union members into the LMRDA, Congress determined that these costs
are outweighed by the interests workers and society have in protecting
freedom of communication among employees.99 For although autocratic
unions may satisfy the material demands of their members with a minimum
of conflict, only democratic unions which tolerate dissent and criticism
can foster the industrial self-determination upon which true industrial
Caputo, 316 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1963); Morrissey v. National Maritime Union of
America, 397 F. Supp. 659 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Pearl v. Tartantola, 361 F. Supp. 288
(S.D.N.Y. 1973).
95Although section 101(a)(2) appears to be an alternative basis on which to
attack contractual waivers, it probably cannot be used to significantly expand the
solicitation-distribution rights of employees beyond the boundaries currently estab-
lished by Section 7. Since the "Bill of Rights" applies only to the union-member re-
lationship, section 101(a)(2) cannot be invoked to nullify restrictions promulgated
unilaterally by management against organizational activities falling outside the scope
of Section 7. While section 101(a)(2) might prohibit unions from inducing or
bargaining with employers to institute such unilateral rules, in practice this would b-
extremely difficult to prove.
96 See Armco Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 344 F.2d 621, 624 (6th Cir. 1965), denying
enforcement 148 N.L.R.B. 1179 (1964); Comment, NLRB v. Magnavox Co.: The
Death Knell jor Union Waivers of Employee Rights to Distribute Literature, 60 VA.
L. REV. 1073, 1077 (1974).
97 See Comments by John Dunlop and accompanying discussion cited in Beaird,
supra note 84, at 580, and Cox, supra note 84, at 829-30.
98 See Cox, supra note 84, at 830.
99 See Navarro v. Gannon, 385 F.2d 512, 518 (2d Cir. 1967); Salzhandler v.
Caputo, 316 F.2d 445, 451 (2d Cir. 1963); Beaird, supra note 84, at 610.
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peace can be established. 00 Like freedom of speech in the political arena,
the freedom of employees to solicit support and distribute literature in
the workplace engenders dissent and insurgency, but ultimately creates
a more profound idealism and commitment to the nation's basic values
and institutions. 10 1
To fully protect the freedom of workers to communicate with each other
in the workplace, the Board and the courts must not only continue to im-
plement the holding of Magnavox that the solicitation-distribution rights
of all employees are immune from union waiver. They should also
explicitly endorse the view that Magnavox protects fundamental, personal
rights belonging to individual employees. For although both rationales
for the Supreme Court's decision encompass the distribution of union
institutional literature, only the "individual rights" perspective affords
protection to all organizational solicitation and literature distribution
which is pertinent to Section 7.
Interpreting the Magnavox decision in this manner involves substantial
intrusion upon the freedom of labor and management to contract con-
cerning conditions of employment. But the Board and the courts have
not hesitated to limit contractual freedom where fundamental principles
of the nation's labor policy are at stake. 10 2 If union waivers of employee
solicitation-distribution rights merely impinged upon such peripheral or-
ganizational activities as the distribution of literature announcing union
social events, there would be no compelling reason to interfere in the bar-
gaining process between labor and management. But because employers
and incumbent labor organizations often have mutual interests in sup-
pressing challenges to the status quo, these waivers are typically utilized
to restrain dissent and criticism dealing with areas of fundamental concern
to employees. The waivers are directed not only against the organizational
activities of employees supporting rival unions during representation
controversies;' 0 ' they are also invoked to stifle solicitation and literature
distribution by members of dissident caucuses within incumbent labor
organizations and even by militant individuals who are critical of present
union representation or conditions of employment. 10 4 Regardless of the
extent to which insurgent solicitation and literature distribution actually
1 03 See Navarro v. Gannon, 385 F.2d 512, 518-19 (2d Cir. 1967); Cox, supra no:c
84, at 830.
101 See Beaird, supra note 84, at 610; Cox, supra note 84, at 854.
102 See, e.g., Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956); Local 154,
IBEW v. Teamsters Local 959, 507 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1974); Le'dge 743, Int'l Ass'n
of Machinists v. United Aircraft Corp., 337 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1964).
103 E.g., Armco Steel Corp., 148 N.L.R.B. 1179 (1964), enforcement denied, 344
F.2d 621 (6th Cir. 1965); Gale Products, Div. of Outboard Marine Corp., 142
N.L.R.B. 1246 (1963), enforcement denied, 337 F.2d 390 (7th Cir. 1964).
104 E.g., Ford Motor Co., 221 N.L.R.B. No. 99 (Nov. 13, 1975); Dreis & Krump
Mfg., Inc., 221 N.L.R.B. No. 46 (Nov. 4, 1975); General Motors Corp., 211 N.L.R.B.
No. 123 (June 25, 1974), modified, 512 F.2d 447 (6th Cir. 1975); Massey-Ferguson,
Inc., 211 N.L.R.B. No. 64 (June 12, 1974); McDonnell Douglas Corp., 210 N.L.R.B.
280 (1974); Ford Motor Co. (Sterling Plant), N.L.R.B. Ad. L. Decision No. JD-
427-74 (June 21, 1974).
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influence the attitudes of employees, 10 5 ensuring that workers have the
freedom and opportunity to express their opinions and to hear opposing
viewpoints on matters affecting the employment relation is so essential
to the realization of union democracy and industrial self-government that
the Board and the courts are certainly warranted in placing restraints
upon the contractual freedom of unions in this area. Since the potential
for abuse exists for such a broad spectrum of employee organizational
activities, the only effective solution is to erect an absolute prohibition
against union waiver of any employee solicitation-distribution rights.
V. CONCLUSION
The Magnavox decision has been liberally construed to give broad
protection to the solicitation-distribution rights of employees. The NLRB
has held that unions may not bargain away the rights of their opponents
or supporters to conduct any organizational solicitation or literature distri-
bution which is pertinent to matters encompassed by Section 7. However,
the Board has noted that unions may still waive the rights of employees
to distribute union institutional literature. Although it is not yet clear what
position the courts will take, the Sixth Circuit has indicated that the
protection afforded by Magnavox extends to organizational activities
which are concerned only indirectly with the selection or rejection of the
bargaining agent.
The Board and the courts should reject the distinction between insti-
tutional and organizational literature. Besides being difficult to define and
apply, it conflicts with the rationales behind the Magnavox decision. By
abandoning this anomalous distinction, the Board and the courts can
make it clear that unions are precluded from waiving any employee
solicitation-distribution rights. This position would be consistent with the
view that the Magnavox decision protects fundamental rights of individual
employees. Moreover, eliminating all union waivers of employee solicitation-
distribution rights would comport with the principles embodied in section
101(a)(2) of the LMRDA. This section reflects a congressional judg-
ment that the criticism and dissent engendered by the free exchange of
ideas and opinions among workers must be tolerated if we are to achieve
the ideals of union democracy and industrial self-government.
-Alan V. Reuther
105 A recent study has indicated that employees do not attend closely to, nor are
their attitudes greatly affected by, union or management campaign propaganda in
representation elections. Getman & Goldberg, The Behavioral Assumptions Under-
lying NLRB Regulations of Campaign Misrepresentations: An Empirical Evaluation,
Part 11, 28 STAN. L. REV. 263 (1976). However, this study did not analyze the
impact on employees of solicitation and literature distribution dealing with inter- or
intra-union rivalries or with the immediate grievances of workers. In any event, the
importance of this organizational activity cannot be measured by the number of work-
ers whose opinions are altered by it. A shift in the attitudes of a few key workers
can often have significant ramifications in a factory. Moreover, the symbolic im-
portance of assuring at least an opportunity for dissent and criticism to be heard is
crucial to preserving the appearance of fairness and democracy upon which the
nation's system of labor relations is based.
